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The Present Status of Commercial
Speech: Looking for a Clear Definition
Samuel A. DiLullo*
I. Introduction
The first amendment' prohibits Congress from making any law
which abridges freedom of speech or freedom of the press. Histori-
cally, the amendment has protected "political speech." In 1942, the
United States Supreme Court determined that "commercial speech"
was unprotected, by the first amendment and subject to unfettered
government regulation. While the Supreme Court has since reversed
this finding, commercial speech is today afforded less protection than
political speech. At present, however, the parameters of commercial
speech are unclear.
Courts have consistently held that free expression is essential to
a free government.' These courts view the broad dissemination of
information from diverse and antagonistic sources as exposing false-
hoods through education and discussion, and as essential to the pub-
lic welfare.3 Thornhill v. Alabama most effectively expressed this
concept. There, the United States Supreme Court declared that:
The freedom of speech and of the press, which are secured
by the First Amendment against abridgment by the United
States, are among the fundamental personal rights and liberties
which are secured to all persons by the Fourteenth Amendment
against abridgment by a State.
The safeguarding of these rights to the ends that men may
speak as they think on matters vital to them and that falsehoods
may be exposed through the processes of education and discus-
sion is essential to free government. Those who won our indepen-
* Assistant Professor, Villanova University; B.S. 1968, Villanova University; J.D. 1972,
Villanover University School of Law.
1. Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. U.S.
CONST. amend. I.
2. See, e.g., Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
3. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
4. 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
dence had confidence in the power of free and fearless reasoning
and communication of ideas to discover and spread political and
economic truth . . . Abridgment of freedom of speech and of
the press, however, impairs those opportunities for public educa-
tion that are essential to effective exercise of the power of cor-
recting error through the processes of popular government
.. .5 Freedom of discussion, if it would fulfill its historic func-
tion in this nation, must embrace all issues about which infor-
mation is needed or appropriate to enable the members of soci-
ety to cope with the exigencies of their period. 6
Consistent with first amendment principles, the Supreme Court
allows limited regulation of speech. For example, fighting words, li-
bel, obscenity, child pornography, and advocacy of crime or revolu-
tion are all subject to limitation.7 Prior restraint of speech passes
constitutional muster only in exceptional circumstances and only if
under strict procedural safeguards.8
Since 1942, courts have examined the applicability of the first
amendment to commercial speech. While initially affording commer-
cial speech no protection, these courts later extended almost full con-
stitutional protection to this speech. This article traces the rise and
fall of the commercial speech exception and analyzes recent cases9
dealing with its regulation. The article also addresses unanswered
questions concerning definition and constitutional protection.
5. Id. at 95 (emphasis added).
6. Id. at 102.
7. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (child pornography); Gertz v. Rob-
ert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (libel); Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (in-
citement); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 479 (1957) (obscenity); Chaplinsky v. New Hamp-
shire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (fighting words). In Chaplinsky, the Court declared that:
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the pre-
vention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitu-
tional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous,
and the insulting or "fighting" words - those which by their very utterance
inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. It has been well
observed that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas,
and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be
derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and
morality.
Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72.
8. United States v. New York Times, Co., 444 F.2d 544 (2d Cir. 1971), al'd 403
U.S. 713 (1971). See also Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975) in
which the Court indicated that prior restraint "avoids constitutional infirmity only if it takes
place under procedural safeguards designed to obviate the dangers of censorship systems
.... Id. at 559 (quoting Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965).)
First, the burden of instituting judicial proceedings, and of proving that the ma-
terial is unprotected, must rest on the censor. Second, any restraint prior to judi-
cial review can be imposed only for a specified brief period and only for the
purpose of preserving the status quo. Third, a prompt final judicial determina-
tion must be assured.
Id. at 560. (emphasis in original)
9. Recently, the Supreme Court sidestepped the issue in Lowe v. SEC, 105 S. Ct.
2557 (1985).
II. Early Cases
The evolution of the commercial speech doctrine began in 1942
when the Supreme Court1" first recognized the type of expression
characterized as commercial speech. In Valentine v. Chrestensen,1
Chrestensen purchased an old navy submarine to exhibit for profit.
Chrestensen distributed handbills in the streets of New York City to
advertise his display. A municipal ordinance, however, prohibited
street distribution of printed handbills bearing commercial advertis-
ing.12 When Chrestensen's handbills were found to violate the ordi-
nance, he distributed a double-faced handbill. One side protested the
dock department's refusal of wharfage facilities at a city pier. The
other side contained commercial advertisement for the exhibition of
his submarine.
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the city ordi-
nance, declaring that though other speech can be regulated in the
public interest to a limited extent, the Constitution imposes no re-
straint on government's power to regulate purely commercial adver-
tising. 3 Thus, the Court identified commercial speech, and subordi-
nated it to the government's power to regulate the dissemination of
information in the streets, despite the political protest in the distrib-
uted information.
1 4
The Court further delineated the commercial speech doctrine in
the subsequent cases of Martin v. City of Struthers5 and Breard v.
10. In Zauderer v. Disciplinary Council of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 105 S. Ct. 2265
(1985), the Court confirmed the grant of constitutional protection to commercial speech.
Ii. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
12. New York City, NY, Sanitary Code § 318 provided that:
Handbills, cards and circulars - No person shall throw, cast or distribute, or
cause or permit to be thrown, cast or distributed, any handbill, circular, card,
booklet placard or other advertising matter whatsoever in or upon any street or
public place, or in a front yard or court yard, or on any stoop, or in the vestibule
of any hall or any building, or in a letterbox therein; provided that nothing
herein contained shall be deemed to prohibit or otherwise regulate the delivery
of any such matter by the United States postal service, or prohibit the distribu-
tion of sample copies of newspapers regularly sold by the copy or by annual
subscription. This section is not intended to prevent the lawful distribution of
anything other than commercial and business advertising matter.
Id.
13. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. at 54.
14.
[Aiffixing of the protest against official conduct to the advertising circular was
with the intent, and for the purpose, of evading the prohibition of the ordinance.
If that erosion was successful, every merchant who desires to broadcast advertis-
ing leaflets in the streets need only append a civic appeal, or a moral platitude,
to achieve immunity from the law's command.
Id. at 55. It appeared that a profit motivation was a necessary element of commercial speech.
Subsequent cases have made it clear that it is not. See. e.g., Virginia State Board of Pharmacy
v. Virginia Citizens Consumers Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
15. 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
Alexandria." In Martin,1 a Jehovah's Witness who distributed
door-to-door leaflets advertising religious meetings was fined for vio-
lating an ordinance which prohibited this activity. The Supreme
Court held that the first amendment protected her right to distribute
the leaflets. The Court declared that while the state could impose
time, place and manner limitations, it could not forbid the dissemi-
nation of ideas even though the method of dissemination might be
considered a nuisance. Breard, however, denied first amendment pro-
tection to a door-to-door brush salesman whose communication was
economic and for profit.
In 1964, the Court began to refine the elements of commercial
speech. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,"' an elected official of
Montgomery, Alabama brought a libel action against four clergy-
men and the Times. An advertisement published in the Times in-
cluded statements, some false, about police activity directed towards
members of the civil rights movement. The plaintiff contended that
the constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press
were inapplicable to the advertisements since the allegedly libelous
statements were published as part of a paid commercial advertise-
ment. This contention derived from the doctrine enunciated in
Chrestensen.
Finding reliance on Chrestensen "wholly misplaced," 1' 9 the
Court rejected the plaintiff's argument. In the Court's view, the ad-
vertisement in Chrestensen simply proposed a commercial transac-
tion, the price of admission to the submarine.20 Additionally, the
Sullivan and Chrestensen advertisements were not commercial in the
same sense. Whereas the Chrestensen advertisement was "purely
commercial advertising,"'" the Times advertisement "communicated
information, expressed opinion, recited grievances, protested claimed
abuses, and sought financial support on behalf of a movement whose
existence and objectives are matters of the highest public interest
and concern.""2 The fact that the Times received payment for the
advertisement was immaterial.' s Therefore, advertisements contain-
ing both political and economic information were protected under
16. 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
17. The Court issued Martin in the same term as Chrestensen.
18. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
19. Id. at 265.
20. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376,
385 (1973).
21. 376 U.S. at 276.
22. Id. at 266.
23. "That the Times was paid for publishing the advertisement is as immaterial in this
connection as is the fact that newspapers and books are sold." Id. (citing Smith v. California,
361 U.S. 147, 153 (1959), and Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 64, n.6 (1963),
see also Ginsberg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 474 (1966).
the First Amendment, but purely commercial information was not
protected.
III. The 1970's
In Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human
Relations,24 the Human Relations Commission found that the Pitts-
burgh Press violated a city ordinance by using a gender-based adver-
tising system in its newspaper job listings. 5 On appeal, the Supreme
Court addressed the question of whether the advertisements were
protected speech. Comparing the advertisement with the unprotected
handbills in Chrestensen and the constitutionally protected advertise-
ment in Times, the Court found that the Pittsburgh Press' advertise-
ments did not express:
[A] position on whether, as a matter of social policy, certain
positions ought to be filled by members of one or the other sex,
nor does any of them criticize the Ordinance or the Commis-
sion's enforcement practices. Each is no more than a proposal of
possible employment. The advertisements are thus classic exam-
ples of commercial speech.26
Pittsburgh Press contended that Chrestensen was inapposite
since the newspaper exercised editorial judgment in determining
where to place each job advertisement.17 The Court rejected this ar-
gument, declaring that "[w]e are not persuaded that either the deci-
sion to accept a commercial advertisement which the advertiser di-
rects to be placed in a sex designated column or the actual
placement there lifts the newspaper's actions from the category of
commercial speech." 28
Pittsburgh Press also argued that even if the advertisements
were commercial speech, they should be accorded a higher level of
protection than suggested by Chrestensen. While not directly ad-
dressing this argument, the Court noted that "[d]iscrimination in
employment is not only commercial activity, it is illegal commercial
24. 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
25. See the Court's Appendix to its opinion for a reproduction of the advertisement.
Pittsburgh Press, 413 U.S. at 392.
26. Id. at 385.
27. Although the Human Relations Commission found that Pittsburgh Press deferred
in every case to the advertiser's wishes regarding the column in which a want ad should be
placed, the Court noted that the newspaper did make a judgment whether or not to allow the
advertiser to select the column. Id. at 386.
28. Id. The Court relied on the following cases in reaching this conclusion: New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, at 279-80 (1964); Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Acting
Attorney General, 405 U.S. 1000 (1972); National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319
U.S. 190, 226-27; New York State Broadcasting Assn. v. United States, 414 F.2d 990 (2d Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1061 (1970).
activity under the Ordinance. 29 Therefore, it found the speech in
question even less protected than valid commercial speech."0
The Court also considered whether the Commission's order
should be condemned as a prior restraint.3 1 The Court found that the
Commission's order did not "endanger arguably protected speech,"
because it was clear and swept no broader than necessary. 2
A few years later, in Bigelow v. Virginia"3 the Court substan-
tially abrogated the concept of commercial speech. There, the Su-
preme Court reversed a conviction for violation of a Virginia stat-
utes' which made the circulation of any publication to "encourage or
promote processing of an abortion" a misdemeanor. The advertise-
ment at issue" concerned the availability and legality of abortions in
New York State and offered services of a referral agency there.
The Virginia Supreme Court had assumed first amendment pro-
tections inapplicable because the publications constituted paid com-
mercial advertising.,g The United States Supreme Court, however,
29. 413 U.S. at 388.
30.
Any First Amendment interest which might be served by advertising an
ordinary commercial proposal and which might arguably outweigh the govern-
mental interest supporting the regulation is altogether absent when the commer-
cial activity itself is illegal and the restriction on advertising is incidental to a
valid limitation on economic activity.
Id. at 389.
31. This issue was presented in the brief for Amicus Curiae American Newspaper Pub-
lishers Association 22 n.32, Pittsburgh Press, 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
32. Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Douglas, Stewart and Blackmun, all dissented,
indicating that the doctrine of Chrestensen was soon to fall. Chief Justice Burger found the
Court's holding to be "a disturbing enlargement of the 'commercial speech' doctrine." 413
U.S. at 393. Justice Douglas wrote: "My views on that issue have changed since 1942, the year
Valentine was decided. As I have stated on earlier occasions, I believe that commercial materi-
als also have First Amendment protection." 413 U.S. at 398. Justice Douglas earlier had said
that "[t]he [Chrestensen] ruling was casual, almost offhand. And it has not survived reflec-
tions." Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 541 (Douglas, J., concurring). Justice
Stewart wrote at page 401: "Whatever validity the Chrestensen case may still retain when
limited to its own facts, it certainly does not stand for the proposition that the advertising
pages of a newspaper are outside the protection given the newspaper by the First and Four-
teenth Amendments." Justice Blackmun dissented substantially for the reasons stated by Mr.
Justice Stewart. 413 U.S. at 404.
33. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
34. Bigelow was charged with violating VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-63 (1960) which then
provided that: "If any person, by publication, lecture, advertisement, or by the sale or circula-
tion of any publication, or in any other manner, encourage or prompt the procuring of abortion
or miscarriage, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 812-13.
35.
"UNWANTED PREGNANCY LET US HELP YOU. Abortions are now legal
in New York. There are no residency requirements. FOR IMMEDIATE
PLACEMENT IN ACCREDITED HOSPITALS AND CLINICS AT LOW
COST contact WOMEN'S PAVILION 515 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y.
10022 or call any time (212) 371-6670 or (212) 371-6650 AVAILABLE
SEVEN DAYS A WEEK STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL. We will make all
arrangements for you and help you with information and counseling."
Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 812.
36. The Virginia Court held that the advertisement "clearly exceeded an informational
determined that speech does not lose its constitutional protection
merely because it appears as an advertisement,"7 involves sales or
solicitations, because the newspaper was paid for printing it, or be-
cause the motive for advertising it was profit-oriented. 8s The Court
held that the first amendment protected the advertisement because
(1) it did more than simply propose a commercial transaction and
contained factual material of clear public interest; (2) portions con-
stituted an exercise of the freedom to communicate information, and
disseminate opinion; (3) it conveyed information of potential interest
and value to a diverse audience, including people who might need
the services, those interested in the subject matter or the New York
law and its development, and those seeking reform in the prosecuting
state; and (4) the advertised activity pertained to constitutional in-
terests, specifically, the editor's first amendment interests, which co-
incided with the constitutional interests of the general public.89 The
Court concluded that:
Regardless of the particular label, asserted by the State -
whether it calls speech 'commercial' or 'commercial' advertising
or 'solicitation' - a court may not escape the task of assessing
the First Amendment interest at stake and weighing it against
the public interest allegedly served by the regulation. The di-
verse motives, means, and messages of advertising may make
speech 'commercial' in widely varying degrees.'0
In Bigelow, the Court broadened the scope of first amendment
protection afforded commercial speech. However, since the advertise-
ment in Bigelow merely proposed a commercial transaction, and con-
tained factual material of public interest, the extent of a commercial
speech exception was unclear.' 1
status" and constituted an active offer to perform a service, rather than a passive statement of
fact. 213 Va. 191, 193, 191 S.E.2d 173, 174 (1972).
37. The Court stated that "[t]he central assumption made by the Supreme Court of
Virginia was that the First Amendment guarantees of speech and press are inapplicable to
paid commercial advertisements. Our cases, however, clearly establish that speech is not
stripped of First Amendment protection merely because it appears in that form." 421 U.S.
809, 818 (1975) (citing Pittsburgh Press 413 U.S. 376, 384 (1973) and New York Times 376
U.S. 254, 266 (1964)).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 822.
40. Id. at 826.
41. The lower courts were divided in their interpretation of Bigelow. Some courts inter-
preted Bigelow as disposing of the idea of commercial speech as a separate category. See, e.g.,
Terminal-Hudson Elecs., Inc. v. Dep't of Consumer Affairs, 407 F. Supp. 1075, 1078 (C.D.
Cal.) vacated, 96 S. Ct. 2619 (1976); Anderson, Clayton & Co. v. Washington State Dep't of
Agriculture, 402 F. Supp. 1253, 1256-57 (W.D. Wash. 1975). Other courts interpreted the
case as retaining a category of commercial speech. See. e.g., Terminal-Hudson Elecs., Inc. v.
Dep't of Consumer Affairs, 407 F. Supp. 1075, 1082 (CD. Cal,) (Whelan, J., dissenting),
vacated, 96 S. Ct. 2619 (1976); Wortham v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 399 F. Supp. 633, n.2
(S.D. Tex. 1975); Population Servs. Int'l v. Wilson, 398 F. Supp. 321, 337 (S.D.N.Y. 1975),
prob. juris. noted. 96 S. Ct. 2621 (1976); Urowsky v. Board of Regents, 38 N.Y.2d 364, 369-
Whether there was a first amendment exception for purely
"commercial speech" was squarely placed before the court in 1976
in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council.42 In this case a consumer group challenged a Virginia stat-
ute48 declaring it unprofessional conduct for a licensed pharmacist to
advertise the prices of prescription drugs. The Court first reiterated
the settled propositions that speech does not lose its first amendment
protection because money is spent to project it and is entitled to pro-
tection even though it is disseminated in a form that is "sold" for
profit and may involve a solicitation to purchase, pay or contribute
money. The Court declared that speech which "does no more than
propose a commercial transaction" still warrants some first amend-
ment protection."
Noting that "[a]s to the particular consumer's interest in the
free flow of commercial information, that interest may be as keen, if
not keener by far, than his interest in the day's most urgent political
debate,"4' the Court reasoned that:
Advertising, however tasteless and excessive it sometimes
may seem, is nonetheless dissemination of information as to who
is producing and selling what product, for what reason, and at
what price. So long as we preserve a predominantly free enter-
prise economy, the allocation of our resources in large measure
will be made through numerous private economic decisions. It is
a matter of public interest that those decisions, in the aggregate,
be intelligent and well informed. To this end, the free flow of
commercial information is indispensable."
The "free flow of commercial information" is not absolute. The
Court emphasized that some regulation of commercial speech, such
as time, place and manner restrictions, or restrictions on false or
misleading commercial speech 47 is permissible in order to insure that
commercial speech flows "cleanly as well as freely.""
70, 342 N.E.2d 583, 586, 379 N.Y.S.2d 815, 819-20 (1975); Comment, First Amendment
Protection for Commercial Advertising: The New Constitutional Doctrine, 44 U. CI. L. REV.
205, 218 n.87 (1976).
42. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
43. VA. CODE § 54-524.35 (1974). The statute provided that a licensed pharmacist is
guilty of unprofessional conduct if he "(3) publishes, advertises or promotes, directly or indi-
rectly, in any manner whatsoever, any amount, price, fee, premium, discount, rebate or credit
terms . . . for any drugs which may be dispensed only by prescription." Penalties consisted of
a fine or revocation or suspension of the pharmacist's license. VA. CODE § 54-524.22:1 (1974).
44. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 761-62.
45. Id. at 763.
46. Id. at 765.
47. Id. at 770-71.
48. Id. at 772. Additionally, the Court acknowledged speech which does "no more than
propose a commercial transaction" as a distinct type of speech:
In concluding that commercial speech enjoys First Amendment protection, we
Correctly, the Court anticipated that its holding would open the
floodgates for challenges to other statutes which bar advertisements
by other professionals. 9 Within a year, various statutes prohibiting
advertising were challenged, particularly those involving professional
advertising. Linmark Associates v. Township of Willingboro"0 struck
down a ban on the use of "For Sale" or "Sold" signs. The asserted
purpose behind the prohibition was to stem the flight of white home-
owners from a racially integrated community. In Carey v. Popula-
tion Services International," the Court held that a New York stat-
ute prohibiting the sale and distribution of all contraceptives to
anyone under sixteen years of age was constitutionally infirm. Fried-
man v. Rogers52 distinguished Virginia Pharmacy and upheld a
Texas law prohibiting the practice of optometry under a trade
name." In all of these cases, the Court stressed the constitutional
have not held that it is wholly undifferentiable from other forms. There are com-
monsense differences between speech that does "no more than propose a com-
mercial transaction," and other varieties .... Ideological expression. be it oral,
literary, pictorial, or theatrical, is integrally related to the exposition of thought
- thought that may shape our concepts of the whole universe of man. Although
such expression may convey factual information relevant to social and individual
decision-making, it is protected by the Constitution, whether or not it contains
factual representations and even if it includes inaccurate assertions of fact
• . .Commercial price and product advertising differs markedly from ideological
expression because it is confined to the promotion of specific goods or services.
The First Amendment protects the advertisement because of the "information of
potential interest and value conveyed, rather than because of any direct contri-
bution of the interchange of ideas."
Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771 n.24, 779-80 (Stewart, J. concurring) (citations and foot-
notes omitted).
49.
We stress that we have considered in this case the regulation of commercial
advertising by pharmacists. Although we express no opinion as to other profes-
sions, the distinctions, historical and functional, between professions, may re-
quire consideration of quite different factors. Physicians and lawyers, for exam-
ple, do not dispense standardized products; they render professional services of
almost infinite variety and nature, with the consequent enhanced possibility for
confusion and deception if they were to undertake certain kinds of advertising.
Id. at 773 n.25 (emphasis in original).
50. 432 U.S. 85 (1977).
51. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
52. 440 U.S. 1 (1978).
53. Powell's majority opinion upheld the Texas law, distinguishing Virginia Pharmacy
and Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1972). See infra note 55 and accompanying
text, as follows:
Here we are concerned with a form of commercial speech that has no intrinsic
meaning. A trade name conveys no information about the price and nature of
the services offered by an optometrist until it acquires meaning over a period of
time by associations formed in the minds of the public between the name and
some standard of price or quality.
Friedman, 440 U.S. at 12. Powell further explains:
A trade name that has acquired such associations to the extent of establishing a
secondary meaning becomes a valuable property of the business, protected from
appropriation by others. . . . But a property interest in a means of communica-
tion does not enlarge or diminish the First Amendment protection, . . . requir-
ing a State to allow deceptive or misleading commercial speech whenever the
protections afforded commercial speech while allowing regulation of
time, manner or place.
5
4
The legal codes of professional conduct historically prohibited
lawyer advertising. On the heels of Virginia Pharmacy, Bates v.
State Bar of Arizona,55 challenged this prohibition. In Bates, the is-
sue was whether a state may prevent the newspaper publication of a
lawyer's truthful advertisement concerning the availability and terms
of routine legal advertising. 56 The Court held that the public's need
for information concerning the availability and terms of legal ser-
vices outweighed the alleged detrimental effects of such advertising.
Bates' narrow holding left many unanswered questions. Subse-
quently, the Court had an opportunity to define the permissible pa-
rameters of legal advertising.57 In re Primus" and Ohralik v. Ohio
State Bar Association" considered the issue of direct solicitation. In
Primus, an ACLU attorney, by letter, offered free representation to
a person she met at a meeting where certain individuals were present
who had been sterilized as a condition of continued medical assis-
tance. Finding that Primus had not conducted in-person solicitation,
the Court held that her speech was a part of associational activity
and expression intended to advance beliefs and ideas. 60
In Ohralik, the Ohio State Bar Association found that a lawyer
who personally solicited auto accident victims violated the discipli-
nary rule against in-person solicitations. The Supreme Court upheld
this finding. Comparing Bates, the Court stated that:
Unlike a public advertisement, which simply provides informa-
tion and leaves the recipient free to act upon it or not, in-person
solicitation may exert pressure and often demands an immediate
response, without providing an opportunity for comparison or re-
flection . . .In-person solicitation is as likely as not to discour-
age persons needing counsel from engaging in a critical compari-
son of the "availability, nature, and prices" of legal services; it
actually may disserve the individual and societal interest, identi-
fied in Bates, in facilitating "informed and reliable
decisionmaking."61
publication of additional information can clarify or offset the effects of the spuri-
ous communication. 440 U.S. at 12 n.11.
54. The Friedman Court's footnote describing commercial speech as "speech
linked inextricably to commercial activity," engendered some confusion in later cases. 440
U.S. at 10 n.9.
55. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
56. Id. at 384.
57. Stoldenburg and Whitman, Direct Mail Advertising By Lawyers, 45 U. PiTT. L.
REV. 381 (1984).
58. 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
59. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
60. Primus, 436 U.S. at 438 n.32.
61. 436 U.S. at 457-58. The Court outlined the case as follows:
Although both Ohralik and In re Primus added to the evolving
commercial speech doctrine, the courts still lacked a clear standard
for determining when commercial speech regulations would be
permitted.
IV. The 1980's
In 1980, a test was established in Central Hudson Gas and
Electric Corporation v. Public Service Commission.62 There, the
New York Public Service Commission completely banned electric
utilities from advertising to promote the use of electricity. The basis
for the Commission's order was the conservation of energy. The
Commission had determined that the utility systems in New York
State had insufficient sources of supply to meet customer demand for
the 1973-1974 winter. Subsequently, the ban was extended in a pol-
icy statement issued in February 1977. Central Hudson Gas and
Electric Corporation opposed the ban on first amendment grounds.
The Commission's order, in the Court's words, restricted "only
commercial speech," which is, "expression related solely to the eco-
nomic interests of the speaker and its audience."63 The Court then
reviewed its previous decisions limiting the government's power to
regulate commercial speech because of consumers' informational in-
terest.64 It noted that people perceive their own best interest if well
enough informed, and that the best means to adequate information is
to open the channels of communication. Therefore, incomplete but
accurate information is better than no information at all.65
The Court reiterated the "common sense" distinction between
speech proposing a commercial transaction traditionally subject to
government regulation, and other varieties of speech. It found that
the protection available turns on the nature of the expression and of
the governmental interests served by its regulation.66 Thus, in order
for the state to restrict commercial speech it must assert a substan-
He approached two young accident victims at a time when they were especially
incapable of making informed judgments or of assessing and protecting their
own interests. He solicited Carol McClintock in a hospital room where she lay in
traction and sought out Wanda Lou Holbert on the day she came home from the
hospital, knowing from his prior inquiries that she had just been released ....
He employed a concealed tape recorder .. . .He emphasized that his fee would
come out of the recovery, thereby tempting the young women with what sounded
like a cost-free and therefore irresistible offer.
Id. at 467.
62. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
63. Id. at 561 (emphasis added). It does not appear, as discussed subsequently, that the
court intended here to expand the definition of commercial speech as was later argued in Lowe
v. Securities Exchange Comm'n, No. 83-1911, Slip. Op. (U.S. June 10, 1985).
64. 447 U.S. 557, 561-62.
65. Id. at 562. (citations omitted)
66. Id. at 562-63.
tial interest and the regulatory technique it uses must be in propor-
tion to that interest. Furthermore, any assumed limitations in expres-
sion must be carefully designed to achieve the state's asserted goal.
The court adopted two criteria to determine state compliance with
this requirement. 67 "First, the restriction must directly advance the
state interest involved; the regulation may not be sustained if it pro-
vides only ineffective or remote support for the government's pur-
pose. Second, if the governmental interest could be served as well by
a more limited restriction on commercial speech, the excessive re-
strictions cannot survive." 68
A year later, in the case of In re R.M.J.,69 the Court summa-
rized the bounds of commercial speech regulation with reference to
lawyer advertising. Essentially reiterating the test from Central
Hudson, Justice Powell wrote:
Truthful advertising related to lawful activities is entitled to the
protections of the First Amendment. But when the particular
content or method of the advertising suggests that it is inher-
ently misleading or when experience has proved that in fact such
advertising is subject to abuse, the States may impose appropri-
ate [and reasonably necessary] restrictions. Misleading advertis-
ing may be prohibited entirely. But the States may not place an
absolute prohibition on certain types of potentially misleading
information.
Even when a communication is not misleading, the State
retains some authority to regulate. But the State must assert a
substantial interest and the interference with speech must be in
proportion to the interest served.
70
Since Bates the Court has developed rules relating to lawyer
advertising. Bates made it clear that attorneys have the right to ad-
vertise. In R.M.J. the Court applied the four part Central Hudson
test to legal advertising. Primus and Ohralik, through their differing
results, further delineated the permissible limits for legal advertising.
The Supreme Court further loosened the restrictions on lawyer
advertising in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Su-
preme Court of Ohio." There, an Ohio attorney published advertise-
ments in thirty-six newspapers. The advertisement publicized his
willingness to represent women who had suffered injuries as a result
of their use of a Dalkon Shield Intrauterin Device and featured a
67. Id. at 564.
68. Id.
69. 455 U.S. 191 (1981).
70. Id. at 203.
71. 105 S. Ct. 2265 (1985).
line drawing of the Dalkon Shield. The defendant also published ad-
vertisements soliciting drunken driving cases. In the ad he indicated
that in the event of conviction, full legal fees would be refunded.
Based upon these advertisements, Zauderer was charged with viola-
tion of various provisions of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsi-
bility and Ohio Disciplinary Rules. 2 The issue, as posed by the
Court, was whether an attorney may be disciplined for soliciting bus-
iness by advertisements containing nondescriptive illustrations and
legal advice, and whether a state may require attorneys to disclose in
their advertisements certain information regarding fee arrangements.
Zauderer relied on the decisions of Bates and R.M.J. for his
claim of first amendment protection. Justice White, writing for the
majority, resolved the case by analyzing the three separate forms of
regulation imposed by the Ohio Rules: (1) prohibitions in soliciting
legal business through advertisements containing advice and infor-
mation regarding specific legal problems; (2) restrictions on the use
of illustrations in advertising by lawyers; and (3) disclosure require-
ments relating to the terms of contingent fees. 8
The Court found for Zauderer with respect to the Ohio Rules
prohibiting self-recommendation.7 4 The Court based its decision on a
restrictive reading of the rules.7 5 It found no merit in the Counsel's
argument that the law served the same purpose as the ban against
in-person solicitation upheld in Ohralik,71 and found the fear that
lawyers will "stir up litigation" unjustified. The Counsel argued
72. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-106(c) prohibited represen-
tation of criminal defendants on a contingent fee basis. DR 2-101(A) provides that "[a] law-
yer shall not, on behalf of himself, his partner, associate or any other lawyer affiliated with
him or his firm, use, or participate in the use of, any form of public communication containing
a false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim." DR 2-
101(B) prohibited use of illustrations in advertisements run by attorneys.
73. 105 S. Ct. at 2275.
74. Id. at 2284.
75. Id. at 2276 n.9. The Court stated that:
The absence from appellant's advertising of any claims of expertise or promises
relating to the quality of appellant's services renders the Ohio Supreme Court's
statement that "an allowable restriction for lawyer advertising is that of asserted
expertise" beside the point. Appellant stated only that he had represented other
women in Dalkon Shield litigation - a statement of fact not in itself inaccurate.
Although our decisions have left open the possibility that States may prevent
attorneys from making nonverifiable claims regarding the quality of their ser-
vices . . . they do not permit a State to prevent an attorney from making accu-
rate statements of fact regarding the nature of his practice merely because it is
possible that some readers will infer that he has some expertise in those areas.
Id. (citation omitted).
In addition the Court noted that the Ohio rules required the state to establish that "prohibit-
ing the use of such statements to solicit or obtain legal business directly advances a substantial
governmental interest." 105 S. Ct. at 2277.
76. 105 S. Ct. at 2277.
77. Id.
To be sure, some citizens, accurately informed of their legal rights, may file
lawsuits that ultimately turn out not to be meritorious. But the State is not enti-
that broad prophylactic rules are necessary to regulate the advertis-
ing of legal services because it is difficult to distinguish truthful and
helpful advertising from falsity and deception. The Court was un-
persuaded: "Our recent decisions involving commercial speech have
been grounded in the faith that the free flow of commercial informa-
tion is valuable enough to justify imposing on would-be regulators
the costs of distinguishing the truthful from the false, the helpful
from the misleading, and the harmless from the harmful.""9 The
Court did, however, uphold the Counsel's position concerning dis-
closure requirements."s Zauderer thus protects an attorney's right to
tied to prejudge the merits of its citizens' claims by choking off access to infor-
mation that may be useful to its citizens in deciding whether to press those
claims in court . . . . [I]f the the State's concern is with abuse of process, it can
best achieve its aim by enforcing sanctions against vexatious litigation. In addi-
tion, there would be no impediment to a rule forbidding attorneys to use adver-
tisements soliciting clients for nuisance suits - meritless claims filed solely to
harass a defendant or coerce a settlement. Because a client has no legal right to
file such a claim knowingly, advertisements designed to stir up such litigation
may be forbidden because they propose an "illegal transaction."
Id. at 2279 n.12. See also Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376
(1973); 105 S. Ct. at 2279 n.12.
78. 105 S. Ct. at 2278-79.
79. Id. at 2279-80.
The American Bar Association evidently shares the view that weeding out false
or misleading advertising by attorneys from advertising that is accurate and non-
misleading is neither impractical nor unduly burdensome: the ABA's new model
Rules of Professional Conduct eschews all regulation of the content of advertis-
ing that is not "false or misleading." ABA, Model Rule of Professional Conduct
7.2 (1983). A recent staff report of the Federal Trade Commission has also con-
cluded that application of a "false or deceptive" standard to attorney advertising
would not pose problems distinct from those presented by the regulation of ad-
vertising generally. See Federal Trade Commission Staff Report, Improving
Consumer Access to Legal Services: The Case for Removing Restrictions on
Truthful Advertising 149-155 (1984).
Id. at 2279 n.13.
80.
We do not suggest that disclosure requirements do not implicate the advertiser's
First Amendment rights . . . . We recognize that unjustified or unduly burden-
some disclosure requirements might offend the First Amendment by chilling pro-
tected commercial speech. But we hold that an advertiser's rights are adequately
protected as long as disclosure requirements are reasonably related to the State's
interest in preventing deception of consumers.
Id. at 2282.
We reject appellant's contention that we should subject disclosure requirements
to a strict "least restrictive means" analysis under which they must be struck
down if there are other means by which the State's purposes may be served.
Although we have subjected outright prohibitions on speech to such analysis, all
our discussions of restraints on commercial speech have recommended disclosure
requirements as one of the acceptable less restrictive alternatives to actual sup-
pression of speech . . . . Because the First Amendment interests implicated by
disclosure requirements are substantially weaker than those at stake when
speech is actually suppressed, we do not think it appropriate to strike down such
requirements merely because other possible means by which the State might
achieve its purposes can be hypothesized. Similarly, we are unpersuaded by ap-
pellant's argument that a disclosure requirement is subject to attack if it is "un-
derinclusive" - that is, if it does not get at all facets of the problem it is
designed to ameliorate. As a general matter, governments are entitled to attack
advertise through a printed medium so long as the ad contains truth-
ful and nondeceptive information or advice regarding the legal rights
of the public.
In Lowe v. Securities Exchange Commission,"1 decided June
10, 1985, the Supreme Court again attempted to delineate the pre-
cise bounds of commercial speech. The Court, however, was con-
fronted by dissimilar interpretations of commercial speech by the
circuits, and by its own ostensibly different definitions.82 Lowe was
the president of three corporate entities involved in the subject litiga-
tion: (a) Lowe Management Corporation; (b) Lowe Publishing Cor-
poration and (c) Lowe Stock Chart Service, Inc. Between March
1974 and May 1981, Lowe Management was registered with the
S.E.C. as an investment adviser pursuant to the Investment Advisors
Act of 1940.88 It published investment advice and managed the
funds of its clients, on a discretionary basis. In 1977, Lowe was con-
victed of two New York misdemeanors related to his investment ad-
problems piecemeal, save where their policies implicate rights so fundamental
that strict scrutiny must be applied.
Id. at 2282 n.14 (citation omitted).
81. No. 83-1911, slip. op (U.S. June 10, 1985).
82. In Virginia Pharmacy, the Court defined commercial speech as speech which does
no more than propose a commercial transaction. 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976). In Central Hudson
Gas, however, it was defined as "expression related solely to the economic interests of the
speaker and its audience." 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980). In Pittsburgh Press, 413 U.S. 376, 384
(1973), and Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942), the Court defined commercial speech as
"purely commercial advertising."
In Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 104 S.Ct. 3244 (1984), Justice O'Connor described
commercial speech as: "[s]peech intended and used to promote a commercial transaction with
the speaker." Id. at 3258 (O'Connor, J., concurring). In Bose Corporation v. Consumers Union
of United States, Inc., 446 U.S. 485 (1984), the Court indicated that the publication of infor-
mation and opinions about products offered to the public was protected by the first amend-
ment. Complicating matters further, the views of the Second, Third, Fourth and Fifth Circuits
were not in accord. In the 1982 case of Ad World, Inc. v. Township of Doylestown, 672 F.2d
1136 (3rd Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 975 (1982), the Third Circuit applied both the
Central Hudson and Virginia Pharmacy definitions in enjoining a township ordinance that
prohibited dissemination of appellants' newspaper. The court found that, "The line between
commercial and noncommercial speech for first amendment purposes, cannot be drawn by
some magic ratio of editorial to advertising content. The important question is whether the
publication as a whole relates solely to the economic interest of the speaker and its audience."
672 F.2d at 1139. A year later, the Fourth Circuit decided Davenport v. City of Alexandria,
710 F.2d 148 (4th Cir. 1983). There the court referred to commercial speech as a legal term
of art referring to advertising. In 1984, the Fifth Circuit decided Turner Advertising Company
v. National Service Corporation, 742 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1984). There, an advertising agency
posted billboards concerning a bankrupt's failure to pay a certain creditor. In determining the
degree of first amendment protection to be afforded to the advertising the court found that it
was not "mere commercial speech" because it was not being published by one whose profit
interests were served by the view espoused and, furthermore, it was not in the form of a paid
advertisement. The message "more clearly resemble[d] a public service message," for which
the speaker was "not being remunerated." Id. at 862. The court stated that while the term
"commercial speech" has never been defined explicitly by the Supreme Court, the Court has
described commercial speech as communication "related solely to the economic interest of the
speaker and its audience" or as speech "which does no more than propose a commercial trans-
action." Id. at 861 (citations omitted).
83. Investment Advisor's Act of 1940, § 203(c), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(c) (1976).
vising business8 4 and in 1978 was convicted of two New York
felonies.8 5
As a result, the S.E.C. instituted an administrative proceeding
under the Investment Advisors Act against Lowe and Lowe Manage-
ment." The S.E.C. found that Lowe had aided and abetted willful
violations of the anti-fraud provisions of the Act, violated the report-
ing provisions of the Act, and failed to amend Lowe Management's
investment advisory registration form to report the convictions which
related to his conduct as an investment adviser.87 The S.E.C. revoked
the registration of Lowe Management as an investment advisor and
barred Lowe from association with any investment advisory.88 De-
spite the Commission's order Lowe published two investment advi-
sory services, the Lowe Investment and Financial Letter and the
Lowe Stock Advisory.89 The S.E.C. brought an action in federal dis-
trict court, alleging that Lowe, Lowe Management Corporation and
two other unregistered corporations were violating the Investment
Advisors Act and that Lowe was violating the S.E.C.'s order by pub-
lishing newsletters containing investment advice and commentary.90
Following trial in the district court, Judge Weinstein found in
favor of the S.E.C. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, reversed, setting the stage for the Supreme
Court to make a decision of potentially great constitutional and eco-
nomic impact. Major points of disagreement between the district and
appellate court involved: (a) interpretation of the publishers' exemp-
tion, (b) definitions of commercial speech and (c) first amendment
84. Lowe pleaded guilty to making false representations to a client in violation of N.Y.
Gen. Bus. Law § 352-c (McKinney 1968). He also pleaded guilty to failing to register in New
York as an investment advisor pursuant to N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 359-a (McKinney 1968).
See Securities & Exchange Commission v. Lowe, 556 F. Supp. 1359, 1361 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
85. The felony convictions involved tampering with physical evidence to cover up fraud
on an investment client, N.Y. Penal Law § 215.40 (McKinney 1975), and third degree larceny
for fraudulently drawing checks on an account to which worthless checks had been deposited,
N.Y. Penal Law § 155.30 (McKinney 1975). Id.
86. The S.E.C. proceedings were under Section 203 of the Investment Advisor's Act of
1940. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(e) & (f) (1976).
87. S.E.C. v. Lowe, 556 F. Supp. 1359 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
88. Id. at 1362.
89. The Lowe Investment and Financial Letter had approximately 2,408 subscribers at
the time of the SEC action. Subscriptions cost $39 for one year or $79 for three years. A
typical Lowe Investment and Financial Letter gives a short-term and long-term forecast. It
offers advice on the relative desirability of investing in, among other things, stocks, Treasury
bills, and money market funds, and describes rather generally the state of the market. It rec-
ommends particular stocks and groups of stocks for purchase or sale, discusses precious metals,
and announces special reports and the telephone hot-line service. The Lowe Stock Advisory
has approximately 700 paid and unpaid subscribers. The Stock Advisory is typically more
specific, however, with a brief introductory examination of general 'market trends followed by
specific purchase, sale, and hold recommendations, particularly for low-priced stocks. A third
publication, the Lowe Stock Chart Service, has solicited subscriptions, but has never been
published. Id.
90. 556 F. Supp. 1359 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
protection from prior restraint. The district court stated that "invest-
ment advisory material disseminated to the public is not commercial
advertising of a product or service" 9' and found that economic dis-
cussion addresses issues of public concern and qualifies as ideological
debate.92 Judge Weinstein noted that "[t]he combination of fact, ec-
onomic and political analysis, conjective and recommendations char-
acteristic of investment newsletters places them outside the rubric of
commercial speech and raises unanswered questions concerning the
conditions, if any, under which an absolute restraint may constitu-
tionally be imposed upon them."93
Additionally, the district court found that even if the Lowe pub-
lications constituted commercial speech and were, therefore, entitled
to less than full protection of the first amendment, the censorship
that the S.E.C. imposed on Lowe was more extreme than necessary
to effectuate the congressional goal of a confident and informed in-
vesting public.
94
The court of appeals, in reversing the district court, stated:
... [W]e do not believe that the Supreme Court has limited
commercial speech solely to product or service advertising. In
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, the Court said that "[i]f com-
mercial speech is to be distinguished, 'it must be distinguished
by its content'. . . ." Although Central Hudson Gas stated that
"[t]he First Amendment's concern for commercial speech is
based on the informational function of advertising," the Court
did not define commercial speech in these terms. Rather it de-
fined commercial speech as "expression related solely to the eco-
nomic interests of the speaker and its audience .. . ." [T]he
Court stated "[b]y definition, commercial speech is linked inex-
tricably to commercial activity . . . ." These definitions do not
limit commercial speech to advertising and are broad enough to
encompass Lowe's publications.'"
The Supreme court granted certiorari to consider the constitu-
tional question of whether an injunction against Lowe's publication
and distribution of newsletters was prohibited by the first amend-
ment. In its decision, however, the Court chose not to decide the
constitutional question since it was able to dispose of the case on
other grounds."'
91. Id. at 1366.
92. Id. at 1367.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1366.
95. 725 F.2d 892, 900-01 (2nd Cir. 1984) (citations omitted).
96.
Moreover, in view of the fact that we should "not decide a constitutional ques-
tion if there is some other ground upon which to dispose of the case," and the
Justice White, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Rehn-
quist, wrote a concurring opinion which did address the constitu-
tional questions. Justice White stated the constitutional issue as
follows:
The Government contends that . . . petitioner's speech is "ex-
pression related solely to the economic interest of the speaker
and its audience" and is therefore subject to the reduced protec-
tion afforded what we have come to describe as "commercial
speech." Under the commercial speech doctrine, restrictions on
commercial speech that directly advance a substantial govern-
mental interest may be upheld ....
Petitioner . . . argues that the expression contained in his
newsletters is not commercial speech, as it does not propose a
commercial transaction between the speaker and his audience
... . Accordingly, he argues, the prohibition on his speech can
be upheld "only if the government can show that the regulation
is a precisely drawn means of serving a compelling state
interest. ''"
7
Lowe's newsletters clearly proposed commercial transactions.
But, were they solely related to economic interests of the speaker?
Lowe only sold his newsletter, not the proposed stock. Clearly, how-
ever, he earned economic benefit from the sale of the newsletters.
Justice White, although addressing the first amendment ques-
tion, did not resolve the uncertainty concerning the definition of
commercial speech, but stated that the Act's ban was too broad to
survive even the lesser scrutiny of commercial speech. The first
amendment, White stated, "permits restraints on speech only when
they are tailored to advance a legitimate governmental interest. I
would hold that the Act . . . is too blunt an instrument to survive
even the reduced level of scrutiny called for by the restrictions on
commercial speech." 98 Thus, a precise boundary of commercial
speech remains to be charted.
further fact that the District Court and the dissenting judge in the Court of
Appeals both believed that the case should be decided on statutory grounds, a
careful study of the statute may either eliminate, or narrowly limit, the constitu-
tional question that we must confront.
Lowe v. S.E.C., No. 83-1911, slip. op. at 8 (U.S. June 10, 1985).
We therefore conclude that petitioners' publications fall within the statutory ex-
clusion for bona fide publications and that none of the petitioners is an "invest-
ment adviser" as defined in the Act. It follows that neither their unregistered
status, nor the Commission order barring Lowe from associating with an invest-
ment adviser, provides a justification for restraining the future publication of
their newsletters. It also follows that we need not specifically address the consti-
tutional question we granted certiorari to decide.
id. at 29.
97. Id. at 23 (White, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
98. Id. at 24-25.
Clearly, pure verbal advertising of a product or service for profit
is commercial speech. Should commercial speech include expression
related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audi-
ence when those economic interests are not, as in Lowe, reciprocal,
but only indirectly related? Lowe did not advertise his newsletter.
His newsletter advertised stocks. Lowe, however, did not benefit by a
sale of the advertised stock, but only by sale of his newsletter. Ac-
cepting Justice O'Connor's definition in Roberts v. United States
Jaycees that commercial speech is "speech intended and used to pro-
mote a commercial transaction with the speaker,"'9 the newsletters
are not commercial speech. Even applying the commercial speech
definition of Central Hudson, "expression related solely to the eco-
nomic interests of the speaker and its audience,"100 Lowe had no
economic interest in the substance of the newsletter regardless of
whether the reader bought or sold securities in reliance on the news-
letter. It could be argued, however, that transactions due to Lowe's
recommendations, if beneficial as a result of the recommendations,
could stimulate sales of the newsletter and, thus, affect Lowe's eco-
nomic interests.
Of course, the publisher of a newsletter profits by the sale of
subscriptions. This should in no way diminish his entitlement to first
amendment protection, since speech "is protected even though it is
carried in a form that is 'sold' for profit." 101 Otherwise, there would
be no first amendment protection for any book, movie, magazine, or
newspaper that is not given away free of charge.1 02
Viewed in context, the Central Hudson advertisements promot-
ing the use of electricity did not fit within the Virginia Pharmacy or
Roberts articulation of commercial speech because they did not pro-
mote a particular commercial transaction. However, they did serve
to promote, generally, the sale of the speaker's product.103 In terms
of the first amendment, Lowe's comments about the advisability of
buying selected stock was no different from Consumer Reports', or
Motor Trends', comments about the advisability of buying a particu-
lar car. All such publications add to the free flow of information that
is indispensable to our free society, and all are constitutionally pro-
99. 104 S. Ct. 3244, 3258 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
100. Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York,
447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980).
101. Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748, 761 (1976); see also Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1970).
102. See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations, 413 U.S.
376, 384-85 (1973); Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 474 (1966); New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 150 (1959);
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952).
103. Compare Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Commission, 47 N.Y.2d 94,
390 N.E.2d 749, 417 N.Y.S.2d 30 (1979).
tected against prior restraint.
The Central Hudson advertising was clearly intended to pro-
mote sales and, therefore, speech in the context of a commercial
transaction. However, if the definition of commercial speech is ex-
panded by giving the language of Central Hudson, which defines
commercial speech as related solely to the economic interests of the
speakers and audience, a liberal interpretation, the definition of com-
mercial speech would then also encompass many magazines and con-
sumer reports. This would result in unnecessary and confusing analy-
sis by the courts which have often treated such publications as
protected.10 4 Moreover, these publications lack those salient charac-
teristics of commercial speech that make appropriate a different de-
gree of protection as expressed in Virginia Pharmacy. There, the
Court stated that:
Since advertising is the sine qua non of commercial profits,
there is little likelihood of its being chilled by proper regulation
and forgone entirely.
Attributes such as these, the greater objectivity and hardi-
ness of commercial speech, may make it less necessary to toler-
ate inaccurate statements for fear of silencing the speaker
105
The court of appeals in Lowe, by basing its decision on the more
recent definitions of commercial speech as expression related solely
to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience, (Central
Hudson) and speech linked inextricably to commercial activity,
(Friedman v. Rodgers) may have misinterpreted these expressions in
their particular application. In Central Hudson, the Court's formula-
tion of commercial speech is not an intent to expand the category of
speech, but rather, a restatement required due to the peculiar facts
of the case. But the formulation could further restrict the definition
104. See, e.g., United Medical Laboratories, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System,
Inc., 404 F.2d 706 (9th Cir. 1968) (reports on practices of medical testing laboratories); Gen-
eral Products Co. v. Meredith Corp., 526 F. Supp. 546 (E.D. Va. 1981) (magazine article on
use of wood stoves for heating); Simmons Ford, Inc. v. Consumers Union of the United States,
516 F. Supp. 742 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (review of electric cars); Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union,
508 F. Supp. 1249, 1266-77 (D. Mass. 1981), affid in pertinent part and rev'd in part, 692
F.2d 189, 194 (1st Cir. 1982), affid, 446 U.S. 485 (1984) (review of loud speaker system in
Consumer Reports); Bon Air Hotel, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 704 (S.D. Ga. 1969),
aff'd, 426 F.2d 858 (5th Cir. 1970) (magazine comments on resort hotel accommodations and
services); Farnsworth v. Tribune Co., 43 I1.2d 286, 253 N.E.2d 408 (1969) (newspaper report
on practices of osteopathic physician); Twenty-five East 40th Street Restaurant Corp. v.
Forbds, Inc., 37 A.D.2d 546, 322 N.Y.S.2d 408 (1971), aff'd, 30 N.Y.2d 595, 282 N.E.2d
118, 331 N.Y.S.2d 29 (1972) (restaurant review); All Diet Foods Distributors, inc. v. Time,
Inc., 56 Misc.2d 821, 290 N.Y.S.2d 445 (1967) (derogatory implications of photograph in
book on nutrition); see also Jackson & Jeffries, Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process
and the First Amendment, 65 VA. L. REV. 1 (1979).
105. 425 U.S. at 772 n.24.
of commercial speech by imposing a requirement of economic benefit
to a speaker. The Court, however, stated in its opinion that, "[O]ur
decisions, have recognized the commonsense distinction between
speech proposing a commercial transaction, which occurs in an area
traditionally subject to government regulation, and other varieties of
speech,"' 1 6 citing for this proposition Ohralik and Bates. But each of
these cases involved the traditional subject of lawyer advertising and
the proposal of a commercial transaction between the speaker and a
potential client.
Additionally, the Court's statement in Central Hudson was re-
ferring to and describing the limitation on the Commission's order
restricting Central Hudson's advertising. That is, it referred to the
order prohibiting only that advertising related to the economic inter-
est of the speaker, Central Hudson, and its audience, its customers.
The Commission's policy statement divided advertising expenses into
two broad categories: promotional advertising intended to stimulate
the purchase of utility services, and institutional and informational
advertising, a broad category inclusive of all advertising not clearly
intended to promote sales. Thus, the commercial speech referred to
was the promotion of the speaker's product.
The "speech . .. linked inextricably to commercial activity"
found in Friedman v. Rodgers,0 7 also served to promote the sale of
the speaker's product. More important, the phrase in Friedman was
an observation by the Court that "commercial speech is linked inex-
tricably to commercial activity." Still, the definition actually applied
in Friedman was "speech that does no more than propose a commer-
cial transaction."' 08
In a concurring opinion in Central Hudson, Justice Stevens,
joined by Justice Brennan, noted and addressed the two definitions
referred to by the Court in Central Hudson. Justice Stevens indi-
cated that there was an inherent problem in categorizing speech as
commercial. He noted "it is important that the commercial speech
concept not be defined too broadly lest speech deserving of greater
constitutional protection be inadvertently suppressed."'09 Justice Ste-
vens found both definitions inadequate, one too narrow, the other too
broad. 10 Referring to the Court's statement defining commercial
speech as "expression related solely to the economic interests of the
speaker and its audience," he noted that the definition did not
clearly indicate whether the subject matter of the speech, or the mo-
106. 447 U.S. at 562.
107. 440 U.S. 1, 10 n.9 (1979).
108. Id.
109. 447 U.S. 557, 579 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring).
110. Id.
tivation of the speaker, was the limiting factor.111 Thus, he found the
definition too broad.l11
Justice Stevens also found the Court's second definition, "speech
proposing a commercial transaction," to be restrictive:
Presumably, the definition is intended to encompass advertising
that advises possible buyers of the availability of specific prod-
ucts at specific prices and describes the advantages of purchas-
ing such items. Perhaps it also extends to other communications
that do little more than make the name of a product or a service
more familiar to the general public. Whatever the precise con-
tours of the concept, and perhaps it is too early to enunciate an
exact formulation, I am persuaded that it should not include the
entire range of communication that is embraced within the term
'promotional advertising." 18
The difficulty with the commercial speech doctrine rests in the
critical determination of whether advertising, which is truthful and
not misleading, will enable individuals to arrive at intelligent eco-
nomic opinions and decisions necessary to cope with the exigencies of
the day; whether truthful advertising ensures enlightened decision
making concerning both the proper allocation of resources in our free
enterprise system, and whether such decisions are necessary to self-
government and thus constitute protected speech. Therefore, the
question is: Does commercial speech add to political decision mak-
ing, and if not, does it still warrant first amendment protection?
The Virginia Pharmacy court indicated that advertising may be
more interesting to some consumers then the most urgent political
debate.11 "[E]ven if the First Amendment were thought primarily
to be an instrument to enlighten public decision-making in a democ-
racy, we could not say that the free flow of information does not
secure that goal."1 " Justice Rehnquist disagreed and in his dissent-
ing opinion in Central Hudson noted:
Although the Constitution attaches great importance to freedom
of speech under the First Amendment so that individuals will be
better informed and their thoughts and ideas will be uninhibited,
111. Id.
112.
Neither a labor leader's exhortation to strike, nor an economist's dissertation on
the money supply, should receive any lesser protection because the subject mat-
ter concerns only the economic interests of the audience. Nor should the eco-
nomic motivation of a speaker qualify his constitutional protection; even Shake-
speare may have been motivated by the prospect of pecuniary reward. Thus, the
Court's first definition of commercial speech is unquestionably too broad.
Id. at 579-80.
113. Id. at 580.
114. 425 U.S. at 763.
115. Id. at 765.
it does not follow that "people will perceive their own best inter-
ests," or that if they do they will act to promote them. With
respect to governmental policies that do not offer immediate tan-
gible benefits and the success of which depends on incremental
contributions by all members of society, such as would seem to
be the case with energy conservation, a strong argument can be
made that while a policy may be in the long run in the interest
of all members of society, some rational individuals will perceive
it to their own short term advantage to not act in accordance
with that policy. When the regulation of commercial speech is at
issue, I think this is a consideration that the government may
properly take into account."1 "
Commentators addressing this issue have articulated a similar
divergence of views. For example, one commentator maintains that
since commercial speech advances first amendment values it deserves
first amendment protection. 117 The commentator proposes that the
first amendment protects the interests of the speaker,118 listener, 11'
and the communication process itself.1 a0 Additionally, he believes the
first amendment promotes four basic values: free discussion of politi-
cal and governmental affairs,121 individual self-fulfillment,122 discov-
ery of truth1 2a and individual development through perception. 12
Thus:
For speech to be within the first amendment preserve, it must
advance one or more of the four underlying first amendment val-
ues. Since commercial speech does in fact promote three of the
116. 447 U.S. at 593-94 n.5 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
117. Note, Constitutional Protection of Commercial Speech, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 720,
746 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Constitutional Protection].
118. Id. at 732.
119. Id. at 733-34, citing Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Con-
sumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 756 (1976); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972);
Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 497,
482 (1965); Thornhill v. Alabama 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516,
533-34 (1945); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943).
120. Constitutional Protection, supra note 117, at 135-36 citing Procunier v. Martinez,
416 U.S. 396, 409 (1974); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
121. Constitutional Protection, supra note 117, at 736-37 citing First Nat'l Bank v.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 771, 776-77 (1978); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976); Garrison
v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964); Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272
(1971); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 266 (1964); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936).
122. Constitutional Protection, supra note 117 at - citing Milton, Areopagitica, in
PRosE WRITING 21 (1927); Emerson, First Amendment Doctrine and the Burger Court, 68
CALIF. L. REV. 422, 440 (1980); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 652 (1978);
Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 IOWA L. REv. 1, 3
(1976); Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE LJ. 877
(1963).
123. Constitutional Protection, supra note 117 citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 418
U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372-80 (1927) (Brandeis, J.
concurring); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624-31 (1919) (Holmes, J. dissenting).
124. Constitutional Protection, supra note 117 at 739-43.
four values, it must be granted some protection. The scope of
that protection, however, will be determined through an analysis
of the interests advanced by commercial speech.1 15
Other commentators contend that, "Measured in terms of tradi-
tional First Amendment principles, commercial speech is remarkable
for its insignificance." 2 These commentators argue that "commer-
cial speech has no apparent connection with the idea of individual
self-fulfillment, '' 12 7 nor is it essential to self-government. 128 Rejecting
Virginia Pharmacy, which holds that the free flow of commercial
information enlightens public decision-making, 29 they declare that,
"While an unrestrained flow of commercial advertising may be es-
sential to the efficient functioning of a free market economy, neither
commercial advertising nor a free market economy is essential to in-
formed political decision making."'' 0 This position ignores Virginia
Pharmacy's deference to Justice Douglas' dissent in Dun & Brad-
street, Inc. v. Grave,'8' in which he stated:
The language of the First Amendment does not except speech
directed at private economic decision making. Certainly such
speech could not be regarded as less important than political ex-
pression. When immersed in a free flow of commercial informa-
tion, private sector decision making is at least as effective an
institution as are our various governments in furthering the so-
cial interest in obtaining the best general allocation of
resources. 
1 8 2
The Virginia Pharmacy court also relied on Harlan's concurrence in
F.T.C. v. Proctor and Gamble Co.,'88 in which he stated that
"[p]aper advertising serves a legitimate and important purpose in
the market by educating the consumer as to available alterna-
125. Id. at 743.
126. Jackson & Jeffries, Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process and the First
Amendment, 65 VA. L. REV. 1, 14 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Jackson & Jeffries].
127. Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 126, at 14.
128. Commercial speech is not essential to self-government because"... [it] is defined
in part by the absence of political significance. Speech which does 'no more than propose a
commercial transaction' omits, by definition, any expression essential to self-government." Id.
at 15. The authors conclude:
In our view, the first amendment guarantee of freedom of speech and press pro-
tects only certain identifiable values. Chief among them is effective self-govern-
ment. Additionally, the first amendment may protect the opportunity for individ-
ual self-fulfillment through free expression. Neither value is implicated by
governmental regulation of commercial speech.
id. at 5-6.
129. 425 U.S. at 765.
130. Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 127, at 17.
131. 404 U.S. 898 (1971).
132. Id. at 905 (Douglas J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
133. 368 U.S. 568 (1967).
tives." 1 " Additionally, Stewart's concurring opinion in Virginia
Pharmacy'" noted that commercial advertising may stimulate
thought and debate about political questions such as price control
issues, government subsidies, or special health care, consumer pro-
tection, or tax legislation. 18
Blackmun's concurring opinion in Central Hudson recognized
that the permissible parameters of restraint in commercial speech
are limited to "measures designed to protect consumers from fraudu-
lent, misleading, or coercive sales techniques,"1 37 but not designed
"to deprive consumers of information about products or services."1 8
Blackmun continued: "We have not suggested that the 'common-
sense difference' between commercial speech and other speech justify
relaxed scrutiny of restraints that suppress truthful, nondeceptive,
noncoercive commercial speech. No differences between commercial
speech and other protected speech justify suppression of commercial
speech in order to influence public conduct through manipulation of
the availability of information." 9
These Justices have announced that although the first amend-
ment applies primarily to political speech, it does not except eco-
nomic speech from protection. Even a contrary view would not per se
deny protection to commercial speech, since it embodies an integral
part of the information necessary for informed decision-making in
matters bearing on political issues. Economic decisions do have an
impact on political decision-making, a factor which contributed to
Virginia Pharmacy's. protection of commercial speech. 4
Thus, the first amendment should not only protect political
speech, but should also promote the free flow of commercial infor-
mation. This will serve to enlighten public decision-making on eco-
nomic matters, and to stimulate political thought and debate. More-
over, an attempt to distinguish between commercial speech of great
effect and that of minimal effect will pitch the judiciary into a sub-
jective quagmire similar to that encountered in obscenity cases.
141
V. Conclusion
Historically, the United States Supreme Court has applied first
134. Id. at 603.
135. 425 U.S. at 775 (Stewart, J., concurring).
136. Id. at 780 n.8.
137. 447 U.S. at 574.
138. Id. Blackmun emphasizes that "If the First Amendment guarantee means anything
it means that, absent clear and present danger, government has no power to restrict expression
because of the effect its message is likely to have on the public. Id. at 575.
139. Id. at 578.
140. See infra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
141. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Grove, 404 U.S. 898, 904 (Douglas, J. dissenting from
denial of certiorari).
amendment protection only to political speech. However, as ex-
pressed in Thornhill v. Alabama,"" "[t]hose who won our indepen-
dence had confidence in the power of free and fearless reasoning and
communications of ideas to discover and spread political and eco-
nomic truth."
Achievement of these goals warrants the least restrictive defini-
tions and regulations necessary to maximize the dissemination of in-
formation. Ultimately, a case-by-case analysis may provide the only
practical approach. As long as reasonable men differ on the value of
information in advancing self-government, perhaps the only defini-
tion of commercial speech is "I know it when I see it."' 18
142. 310 U.S. at 88, 95 (1940).
143. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (response to
the court's attempt to fashion a definition of obscenity).
